




Review and experiences of price regulation regimes for district heating
Odgaard, Ole; Djørup, Søren Roth
Published in:
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management







Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Odgaard, O., & Djørup, S. R. (2020). Review and experiences of price regulation regimes for district heating.
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management, 29, 127-140.
https://doi.org/10.5278/ijsepm.3824
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: August 24, 2021
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 29 2020 127
*Corresponding author - e-mail: oleodg@mail.dk
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 29 2020 127–140
ABSTRACT
Europe is facing a great technical and regulatory challenge in transitioning the energy supply 
from fossil fuels to sustainable renewables. Within the heating sector, the Heat Roadmap Europe 
studies have demonstrated great potential and benefits from expanding district heating (DH) 
throughout the continent. However, as a monopoly structure, DH grids require well-thought-out 
regulatory regimes to be accepted by cities and consumers. Effective regulation must safeguard 
consumers against misuse of monopoly prices and set the right incentives to enhance efficiency 
and to introduce new technologies. Founded upon the approach of concrete institutional 
economics, this paper contributes to the literature on DH regulation by reviewing and describing 
regulatory experiences in Denmark and other countries. This article demonstrates that a wide 
range of regulatory mechanisms are available for implementing DH and describes how regulation 
must take into account whether the DH companies are privately or publicly owned by 
municipalities or consumer groups. DH is typically a monopoly supply, which may result in 
higher consumer prices if proper regulation is not in place. Both privately and publicly owned DH 
supplies must be guided by various efficiency-enhancing measures. Regulated prices and the use 
of benchmarks must be carefully prepared in order to work by the book in an often-complicated 
organisational set-up. The use of private enterprises to develop and operate a public DH enterprise 
must involve the establishment of proper incentives and performance measures in the contract, 
etc. A mix of price-setting regimes and ownership models can be determined. The choice of 
model may depend on the specific circumstances, considering, among other concerns, the scale 
of the heat market, the local availability of waste heat, existing ownership of housing, access to 
(cheap) financing, a stable regulatory framework, and confidence-building measures for 
commercial or public investors.
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In the coming few decades, Europe is compelled to tran-
sition its energy systems towards a low- or zero-carbon 
supply. For this to happen, a key challenge is to achieve 
a substantial decrease in fossil fuel consumption in the 
heat sector. The thermal energy demand currently 
accounts for approximately 50% of final energy con-
sumption in Europe [1]. 
Previous studies have demonstrated great economic 
and environmental potential in a wide expansion of DH 
systems across Europe [2]. The Heat Roadmap Europe 
studies suggest that DH systems should cover about half 
of the heat supply in 2050 [3].
Experience, however, has shown that a key barrier to 
establishing new DH systems in many countries are 
some institutional obstacles. Most notably, questions of 
ownership and price regimes are central questions to 
address, which have been dealt with at a theoretical level 
[4,5].
Previous research has focused on local policies [6], 
the effect of electricity and fuel prices on DH invest-
ments and dispatch strategies [7–12], and the effect of 
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DH tariffs schemes on energy savings [13–15] and cus-
tomer experiences [16]. Wissner looks into the general 
necessity of district heating regulation in Germany [17]. 
Sandberg et al. review DH regulation, but the study is 
limited to existing regimes in Nordic countries [18].
With respect to specifically addressing the price reg-
ulation models within district heating, there seems to be 
a gap in the literature. None of the existing contributions 
provide an overview in which a broader range of empir-
ical observations are systematically reviewed and 
described. 
This paper reviews and describes regulatory regimes 
regarding price regulation in district heating systems. 
First, seven different principles for regulating DH sys-
tems are described and reviewed. Afterwards, price reg-
ulation is set into a regulatory context, and seven 
mechanisms are described which surround price regula-
tion in order to strengthen the development of efficient 
DH systems. Finally, main points are summarised in the 
conclusion. 
2. Methodology
The methodological approach for this study is to 
describe and collect real-world experiences with 
price-setting regimes and bring them into the context of 
the academic literature. This approach is connected to a 
theoretical approach to concrete institutional economics 
[19]. This theory is based on the conception that theories 
within economics and public policy often do not address 
the real-world institutional structures that exist and 
shape economic activity. The approach is related to 
Ronald Coase’s scientific paradigm of describing “the 
world of positive transaction cost” in order to inform and 
improve economic theories and practices within public 
policy [20–23]. In the context of this paradigm, the sys-
tematic description of the diversity of existing real-
world institutions has an important role in enhancing the 
regulatory toolbox for addressing regulatory problems. 
The collection and description of institutional diversity 
contributes to theoretical understanding by conveying 
practical experience to the academic literature. 
The following review is primarily based on lifelong 
experience in heat planning in the context of the Danish 
Energy Agency, combined with academic and theoreti-
cal reflections. Hence, in reviewing empirical regulatory 
regimes, the aim of the paper is also to describe and 
convey the informal and tacit knowledge gained through 
practice and set it into dialogue with academic literature. 
3. Price regulation regimes in district heating 
systems
DH differs from electricity supply or natural gas supply 
in a significant way that warrants special regulation. The 
electricity sector can easily be made competitive, as 
individual producers can opt in or out as suppliers of 
electricity to a large grid, which can be interlinked on a 
regional or even national scale. Natural gas is also deliv-
ered by regional or national grids, although the supply is 
usually characterised by few suppliers. But DH is a 
locally bound supply of hot water or steam, where the 
heat loss often restricts large supply grids. Large DH 
grids can of course be established by cooperation 
between the heat producers, but DH is typically a natural 
monopoly with restricted competition. 
Therefore, the choice of price regulation and investor 
security has a significant impact on the development of 
DH. This should be considered before the establishment 
of DH as part of a national policy framework. The use of 
market forces and regulation must be based on thorough 
and well-tested experiences in order to ensure a 
well-functioning DH sector with affordable consumer 
prices and continuous technological improvements.
Based on Danish and European experiences, the fol-
lowing seven main types of regulation principles will be 
described: 1) true costs, 2) true costs plus investor 
return, 3) prices set by the market, 4) substitution price, 
5) price cap, 6) private operation under public owner-
ship, and 7) an ESCO (Energy Service COmpany) 
model. Consumer prices may differ greatly according to 
ownership in at least two of the seven models, which 
will be elaborated upon. 
3.1 True-cost principle 
The true-cost principle implies that the consumer price 
equals all necessary costs of production and distribution. 
Thus, only necessary costs are allowed to be paid by the 
consumers. This price setting protects consumers against 
potential misuse of the natural monopoly supply, as the 
prices are largely non-profit. Denmark has adopted this 
mechanism for most of its DH supply. Prices and deliv-
ery conditions are supervised by national independent 
authorities.
The Danish experiences point to several advantages in 
terms of low prices and a high level of security of 
supply. However, the precondition is that each DH 
supply has been carefully designed and approved on the 
basis of a thorough feasibility study that documents that 
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 29 2020  129
Ole Odgaard and Søren Djørup
DH is the least-cost option compared to alternative heat 
supplies. The calculation method applied is a levelised 
cost of energy, whereby low consumer prices over a 
20-year period are obtained through investments in qual-
ity pipes, energy efficient plants, and well-insulated 
buildings. This standardised feasibility study must also 
be applied in the case of major renovations, investments 
in new technology, and revised/extended supply areas, 
and so on.
The reason for this is that the increased energy effi-
ciency of a carefully designed and integrated energy 
system can bring about lower consumer prices in the 
medium to long term, as the saved energy more than 
outweighs solutions with low capital investment costs 
and also if fuel prices are cheap.
This regulatory set-up is not a guarantee of low con-
sumer prices and efficient solutions at all DH plants, as 
local mismanagement can occur and cause discontent. A 
rule of thumb is that between 5 and 10% of the small DH 
supplies—often owned by the consumers—can improve 
their local management and obtain lower DH prices.
Nearly all DH supplies outside large cities as well as 
some in the big cities are owned by municipalities or 
consumer groups, which are usually not driven by a 
profit motive or the like. These DH supplies are typically 
financed by municipally guaranteed loans with low 
interest rates. The loans are not subsidised, and the 
credit scheme is non-profit and based on true costs.
The disadvantage can be that there is no direct eco-
nomic incentive to lower consumer prices via investment 
in new technologies or other efficiency-enhancing 
 measures. 
However, specific means have been devised to 
enhance efficiency in publicly owned DH companies 
under the true-cost regime in order to obtain low con-
sumer prices (described later). It is difficult to quantify 
the effect of these means, although incomplete interna-
tional comparisons suggest that Danish DH prices are 
relatively low. Euroheat & Power has compiled relevant 
gross data for all EU member states [24]. However, an 
international comparison must be based on true costs, 
and no true cost analysis of the consumer prices are 
made, as these must be based on standardised prices, 
taking direct and indirect subsidies into account. 
Likewise, the countries’ different energy taxes and fees 
must be adjusted for in order to compare the true costs. 
Furthermore, some countries have policies demanding 
co-production of power and heat at the DH plants in 
order to enhance the energy efficiency of the electricity 
production, while other countries have restricted the use 
of fossil fuels in order to promote renewable energy. The 
Danish Energy Agency has made preliminary attempts 
to adjust for some of these parameters, and the unpub-
lished data suggest fairly low consumer prices in 
Denmark per delivered GJ district heat. The Danish 
District Heating Association has also made an attempt, 
and their analysis suggests that consumer prices in 
Sweden and Germany are 6% and 19% higher than in 
Denmark when the differences in taxes and fees have 
been adjusted for [25].
3.1.1 Requirements for special regulation of privately 
owned DH supply
The true-cost principle has the disadvantage that pri-
vately owned DH companies have an incentive to boost 
expenses, as high costs will also be covered by the con-
sumers. The Danish regulation aims to prevent such 
behaviour by stipulating that all costs must be market 
conducive [26,27]. If a local DH company purchases 
fuel and services from a mother company, the prices 
must not be higher than the market price. Thus, transfer 
pricing must explicitly be prevented.
However, the Danish experiences with a large, trans-
national energy company show that the principle of non-
profit costs can be circumvented, when daughter 
companies purchase equipment, fuel, and services from 
a mother company. There is no fixed definition of a 
so-called market-conducive price, i.e. some actors pur-
chase fuel, equipment, and administrative services at 
relatively high prices, whereas others do so at relatively 
low prices. All decentralised heat plants were financed 
with loans obtained from the mother company at very 
high interests. Thus, by selective price setting, among 
others, at several combined heat and power plants, it 
proved possible to increase the local DH costs and thus 
consumer prices substantially from 2007 onwards. Some 
DH companies increased the consumer price by 40-60% 
in the course of roughly 4 years. The Danish Utility 
Regulator publishes the consumer prices for all DH 
companies at regular intervals [28]. If January 2009 is 
taken as the base period for comparison, the DH plants 
in Hjortekær, Gørløse, Skævinge, Ørslev Terslev, 
Annebjergparken, and in other locations have experi-
enced significant increases in their consumer prices. All 
these plants are or were owned by the transnational 
energy company E.ON.
When owned by this transnational energy company, 
each DH company was organised as a daughter company 
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directly under the mother company of the transnational 
energy company. The consumer prices consequently 
rose considerably due to three factors:
1. Relatively high market prices for the purchase of 
fuel and administrative services, etc., from the 
mother company.
2. High costs for repayment of loans to the mother 
company. This was due to the unexpected use of 
a legal option; the mother company could charge 
consumers an amount for the repayment of loans 
that was higher than the actual loan expense.
3. A previous agreement on the consumer price that 
was entered into between the DH company and 
consumers was cancelled.
After consumer prices rose by roughly 50% over the 
course of 4 years, several municipalities decided to buy 
back the crisis-ridden DH supplies from the transna-
tional energy company in 2013. This resulted in lower 
consumer prices at several DH companies, which is 
illustrated in Table 1 below.
The six DH companies still owned by the private 
transnational company experienced nearly unchanged or 
higher consumer prices during 2013. 
The three DH companies that were transferred to 
local municipal or consumer ownership saw declining 
prices in the range of 4,591 DKK to 18,788 DKK over 
the course of one year for a standard household. 
One of these (Slagslunde) is now owned by a con-
sumer cooperative, which has lowered the price from 
30,205 DKK in 2012 to 25,614 DKK in 2013 and to 
17,278 DKK by 2016. Thus, several expenses have been 
notably reduced since the transfer of ownership. The 
transnational company reported and charged for a daily 
water loss of 2,000 litres, which has been brought down 
to 8–9 litres per day. The annual administrative costs 
declined from 1.3 M. DKK to 0.3 M. DKK. The annual 
interest on the capital investments was lowered from 7% 
to 2%. These cost reductions constitute important rea-
sons behind the attainment of favourable consumer 
prices.
Most of the DH supplies owned by the transnational 
energy company by the end of 2013 were transferred to 
municipal ownership during 2014 and 2015. Significantly 
lower consumer prices were obtained for all DH sup-
plies. This was possible due to a special municipality 
credit scheme in Denmark. A credit institution jointly 
owned by all municipalities was established in 1899 and 
has since offered financing for all municipalities’ invest-
ments in infrastructure (energy, schools, roads, etc.). It 
operates on a non-profit basis and offers financing 2–3% 
less than normal commercial loans. The credit scheme 
has not had any bad loans during its more than 120 years 
of operation [29]. 
Thus, the true-cost principle may in general secure 
low consumer prices when the owner exhibits no interest 
in bypassing the intended regulation by using substantial 
legal and administrative resources. Thus, low consumer 
prices under a private ownership regime require:
• a carefully prepared and detailed regulation, 
which takes time to prepare and implement.
• access to a substantial amount of data from DH 
producers and distributors.
• efficient and independent authorities with sufficient 
legal authority and staff to monitor prices and 
delivery conditions and to handle complaints and 
investigate possible infringements, etc.
 Table 1: DH consumer prices for DH companies owned or previously owned by the transnational energy company E.ON  
(Danish Kroner per year)
Name of DH company
DH price: DH price:
Change in DH price Change in ownership15 Dec. 2013 18 Dec. 2012
Hjortekær 37,090 37,096 –6 No. Privately owned 
Annebergparken 31,793 31,803 –10 No. Privately owned 
Ørslev-Terslev Kraftvarmeforsyning 31,041 31,005 36 No. Privately owned 
Slagslunde Kraftvarmeværk 25,614 30,205 –4.591
Yes. Consumer group 
buys DH supply
Præstø Fjernvarme 23,573 21,329 2.244 No. Privately owned 
Lendemarke Varmeforsyning 18,971 13,151 5.820 No. Privately owned 
Skævinge Fjernvarmeforsyning 17,178 27,901 –10.724
Yes. Municipality buys 
DH supply.
Frederikssund Kraftvarme 17,653 17,653 0 No. Privately owned 
Gørløse Fjernvarme 16,338 35,125 –18.788
Yes. Municipality buys 
DH supply.
Consumer prices are listed for a typical house (130 m2, 18.1 MWh heat consumption). 1 Euro ~ 7.5 Danish Kroner.
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The need for independent supervision and monitoring 
of prices at private DH companies is also acknowledged 
in, for example, Estonia. Most DH systems in Estonia 
are owned by private enterprises. In 2003, Estonia 
enacted the Law of District Heating, which provides 
local governments the right to establish central heating 
districts/DH zones and to require the private DH compa-
nies to supply these buildings with DH. The DH compa-
nies are ensured a supply period of up to 12 years; thus, 
a supply monopoly is granted. The consumer price is 
regulated by the Estonian Competition Authority, and in 
2010 detailed principles for determining the upper limit 
of the consumer price in a district/zone were established. 
All prices related to heat supply must be approved by the 
Estonian Competition Authority in order both to protect 
consumers and to ensure that the DH company can 
recover its operating costs and earn a sufficient profit 
[30,31].
3.2 Regulated return to investor 
Another way of setting the DH consumer price is to base 
the heat price on the true costs, as described above, but 
to allow for a higher loan cost. Thus, external investors 
can provide credit based on market conditionality.
This is typically the case for the use of waste heat 
from industries to DH in Denmark. In order to establish 
an economic incentive for companies which are not nec-
essary a part of the DH supply a real interest rate of 
typically 8% can be added to the true cost for heat in 
terms of waste heat [32]. However, the negotiated price 
must not be higher than the alternative heat costs, and in 
the case of complaints, the price must be approved by 
independent authorities. Waste heat is usually cheap and 
efficient to use for DH; thus, the industries are given an 
economic incentive to sell their excess heat at a reason-
able profit.
DH companies owned by municipalities and con-
sumer groups can obtain relatively cheap loans granted 
by a joint municipality-owned credit institution that 
offers an interest rate of about 2–3% less than mar-
ket-based credit institutions [33,34]. This is to the bene-
fit of consumers at the DH plants owned by municipalities 
and cooperatives, but it limits the access of more 
 commercial- and market-based actors in the DH sector.
It can be argued that fair earnings on commercial 
investments should be encouraged in order to achieve 
greater diversity in the ownership structure and access to 
large investment funds, especially among investors with 
an interest in stable, long-term investments, such as 
 pension funds, etc. and those with a preference for secure 
and not necessarily high-earning investments. This can 
be considered in countries where there is no access or 
only limited access to cheap loans and financing.
One possible means to achieve fair earnings would be 
to introduce a market-based interest rate on the actual 
capital investments. A possible market-based interest 
level could be the interest of long-term bonds and maybe 
2–3% per year for a 20-year period. The external inves-
tor would then have to adhere to a set of contractual 
obligations regarding corporate investment responsibil-
ity, etc.
The long-term interest of consumers can eventually 
be secured by:
• public ownership of the DH production company 
in which the external funds are invested with 
restricted or prescribed management according 
to carefully prepared management and decision-
making structures.
• public ownership of the DH transmission and/or 
distribution net, which prevents external investor 
control of the entire DH supply; thus, the 
distribution company can choose another supplier 
in the case of unforeseen or undesired misuse of 
market power. 
• essential endorsement of incentives to improve 
efficiency, as the true cost principle does not 
necessarily impose such pressure. 
The disadvantage is that large investments from pen-
sion funds, etc. require carefully prepared projects based 
on detailed regulatory specifications for investment pro-
tection and possible shared management and so on. This 
is typically not compatible with smaller DH companies. 
When pension funds invest in wind farms, solar PV 
parks, etc., it is a more standardised set-up with easy-to-
forecast rates of return. Small-scale DH supplies are 
much more heterogeneous with regard to choice of fuel 
mix, heat density, and specific local demand fluctuations 
from industries, among other aspects.
3.3 Liberalised price set by the market
Another option is to fully liberalise DH consumer prices, 
which can be set on a market driven by supply and 
demand. The theoretical advantage to this is that the 
market forces are in full swing to increase competition 
and lower costs. The disadvantage, however, is that DH 
is a natural monopoly, where market force can be exerted 
and misused against consumer interests. One such exam-
ple is Sweden, where the heating sector was deregulated 
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and opened to competition in 1996 (with the exception 
of some municipalities which are forced to use cost pric-
ing, i.e. true costs). The 2008 DH Act introduced nego-
tiated prices and means to strengthen transparency in 
pricing. In a 2010 survey among 150 DH plants, 28% 
indicated that profit maximisation was their highest pri-
ority, while others prioritised issues such as municipal 
policy objectives and non-profit operation. 
Due to limited competition on the heat production 
side, DH prices increased by 30% between 2006 and 
2011. DH producers simply increased the price to a level 
close to the alternative heat price of individual heating 
[35]. The incidence of higher prices due to the privatisa-
tion of natural monopolies was also concluded in a 
report to the Swedish Ministry of Finance in 2011 [36]. 
Therefore, the Swedish government introduced new 
reforms in 2012 in order to strengthen a new price-set-
ting scheme to the benefit of consumers. The Market 
Regulation Authority and the Swedish Competition 
Authority were granted the authority to supervise the 
price in the heat-supply market and to control the 
behaviour of the DH producers. A bargaining mecha-
nism has been enforced, which requires the DH compa-
nies to submit their operation reports to the regulatory 
bodies and be committed to the provision of information 
[37]. 
The Swedish reforms also endorsed the privatisation of 
DH supplies. Eighty-three municipality-owned companies 
were privatised. In order to secure lower heat prizes, 21 of 
these 83 DH companies have been re-transferred to public 
ownership by the municipalities [38].
Thus, the Swedish experiences suggest that liber-
alised price setting of DH requires competitive and 
available heat alternatives for consumers. This is rarely 
the case in most places due to at least two reasons. First, 
heat customers in cities usually live in apartment blocks 
with limited access to individual heat devices, apart from 
costly or inefficient heat supply from air conditioners 
and the like. Second, suburban areas with individual 
housing often face exit costs if they choose to exit the 
DH supply and opt for individual heating. Many DH 
customers can only leave the DH supply if they pay off 
their share of the debt in the DH supply, after which a 
capital investment or entry cost payment shall be made 
to an individual heat technology.
Therefore, liberalised price setting often requires sub-
stantial regulation with access to multiple data delivered 
from the market actors if the price setting is to be 
 transparent. It may take time to ensure effective capacity 
building of the independent authorities and to develop 
new procedures. These must be in place before liber-
alised price setting is implemented.
Denmark has in recent years introduced another vari-
ant of negotiated prices at the large combined heat and 
power plants around the big cities. In order to establish 
an incentive to convert from coal and maybe gas to alter-
native sources, a new incentive has been introduced. 
Danish energy taxes and fees on fossil fuels are among 
the highest in the OECD, but biomass is exempted from 
most of these taxes and fees. Therefore, there is a sub-
stantial financial incentive to use biomass as a fuel. 
However, most of these large-scale DH producers are 
commercially owned, and the owners will not receive 
the benefits from exempted taxes and fees. Only con-
sumers will receive benefits in the form of lower prices, 
as consumer prices must reflect true costs. In order to 
give commercial owners a share of this economic bene-
fit, the DH Act has been amended so that the benefit 
from exempted taxes and fees can be shared between the 
DH producer and consumers. Independent authorities 
must approve the price in the case of complaints, as the 
price cannot be higher than the alternative heat cost. This 
was endorsed for the substitution of coal with biomass 
by political agreement in parliament on 22 March 2012 
[39]. This opened up the possibility for additional poli-
cies regarding regulated and controlled profit connected 
to the use of all types of renewables, and a broad politi-
cal agreement in parliament o 29 June 2018 settled this 
pricing policy for all renewables [40].
Thus, a part of the DH price is officially negotiated 
for the group of 16 so-called centralised combined heat 
and power plants (CHPs), i.e. the largest CHPs and the 
earliest DH companies in Denmark which have a special 
regulation in parts of the Heat Supply Act. This arrange-
ment has had a significant effect, as nearly all of the 
large-scale DH producers have converted or decided to 
convert to biomass-based DH before 2023. Denmark’s 
largest utility Ørsted has decided to convert from coal to 
biomass by 2023 at the latest [41]. Only 1 of 16 cen-
tralised CHPs will not have converted to biomass by 
2023—Nordjyllandsværket, which aims to use excess 
heat and renewables other than biomass, is expected to 
have phased out coal by 2028 at the latest [42]. 
 There is as yet no analysis of how these partly nego-
tiated prices affect consumer prices, i.e. if some costs are 
higher relative to the previous costs. 
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3.4 Natural gas-based substitution price of heat 
Another way of regulating the DH price is to link the 
consumer price to the same level as heat produced in 
individual natural gas boilers. Thus, if DH is established, 
the heat cannot be sold for more than the heat price for 
individual natural gas. The advantage would be that DH 
cannot exert a potential misuse of a monopolistic supply 
to the detriment of consumers.
This price setting faces at least two disadvantages. 
Firstly, the (market) price for coal or biomass, etc. varies 
according to supply and demand of these particular 
fuels, and the prices are different from the (market) price 
of natural gas. If the production of, for example, straw 
has been limited due to a natural condition, the procure-
ment price for straw will often increase due to a limited 
supply. If the DH company cannot cover its true costs, as 
the consumer price is linked to natural gas, then the DH 
company will face a deficit. If this occurs several years 
in a row, the DH company may accumulate a deficit, 
which will make the company unable to invest in opera-
tion and maintenance, which are crucial for long-term 
sustainability. 
Alternatively, the state could subsidise DH by financ-
ing the gap between the actual DH production price and 
the substitution price of individual natural gas. This is a 
political option, but such an arrangement entails the risk 
of a continued financial burden on the state budget and 
consequently a lack of funds for other prioritised 
 purposes.
Secondly, the price of individual natural gas can to 
some extent be influenced by the natural gas supply 
companies, which may be used strategically to limit the 
establishment of competition from DH using other fuels. 
For example, the natural gas company can lower the 
consumer procurement price on natural gas—and 
thereby the consumer price for DH—by extending the 
pay-off period of the loan granted to the gas distribution 
net. This may also be a strategic option if supply zones 
for individual natural gas were considered for conver-
sion to DH zones. 
Danish experience has shown that lower market 
prices for natural gas and extended periods for loan 
repayments, among others, have made natural gas heat-
ing more competitive vis-a-vis DH. In 2012, only 5.2% 
of all DH consumers paid more for their heating com-
pared to heating from individual natural gas boilers. In 
2013, the share had increased to 27.4% of DH consum-
ers, partly due to longer periods for loan repayments as 
well as cheaper gas prices [43]. The case illustrates the 
difficulties in linking the DH price to natural gas 
 heating.
Thus, it is not an easy task to establish transparent and 
justifiable benchmarks or substitution prices for DH. It 
requires careful preparation and a continuous difficult 
administrative supervision and monitoring. This regula-
tory approach has been considered in some countries, 
but has only been implemented few places. But the sub-
stitution price of natural gas is used as a benchmark 
when choosing between DH and natural gas for heat 
zones in Denmark.
3.5 Price cap based on alternative supplies 
Another way of regulating the DH price is to regulate the 
price according to the heat price of the alternative DH 
supply. This can be applied to DH produced from waste 
or excess heat from industries, etc., which is sold to a 
DH supply company.
Denmark has applied a price cap for DH produced 
from waste incineration as a special price setting for 
only this type of DH. The price cap for DH from waste 
incineration plants is set by the price for DH from the 
largest combined heat and power plants in Denmark 
[26]. The advantage of this system is that the DH supply 
companies/consumers are guaranteed a price that equals 
the price of the large-scale heat supply, and waste incin-
erations plants do not favour or disfavour local consum-
ers economically. 
However, a price cap may have a disadvantage in that 
it contains an incentive to set the DH price as the maxi-
mum allowed price. There is not necessarily an eco-
nomic incentive to lower the price via increased 
efficiency, etc. for the waste incineration plant. 
Another disadvantage—which is not the case in 
Denmark—is that the true costs may not be covered if 
the price of waste is relatively high. This could threaten 
the long-term economic sustainability. Alternatively, as 
mentioned above, the state could subsidise DH by 
financing the gap between the actual DH production 
price and the substitution price of individual natural gas, 
which may place a continued financial burden on the 
state budget.
3.6 Private operation under public ownership
Local governments may own a DH supply without oper-
ating it. This sort of public-private partnership (PPP) can 
be a relevant option if a municipality or the like lacks 
experience in proper operation and maintenance, does 
not possess experience in efficient business  development, 
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or if the legal framework for public management is 
insufficient.
The private operation may be temporary or perma-
nent. If the purpose is to promote a relatively quick 
development of DH, the contract can stipulate that the 
operation can be transferred to a public entity after, for 
example, 10 years with training of public staff during the 
last 3 years, for example.
Thus, the responsibility of the DH operation and 
related new investments are transferred to private enter-
prises through lease or authorisation contracts, in which 
the investments, management, and operation risks 
incurred from all facilities are transferred to private 
enterprises. 
Joint finance can also take place; for example, the 
local government can contribute with equity in the form 
of transfer of assets or land.
The United Kingdom and other countries in Europe, 
plus China and other Asian countries, have developed 
this model for DH [44,45]. A variety of specific models 
has evolved in different countries [46]. Typical business 
models are reconstruction-operation-transfer (ROT) and 
transfer-operation-transfer (TOT). During the construc-
tion period, the private enterprise is typically tasked with 
project investment and financing, design, and construc-
tion. During the operation period, the private enterprise 
is responsible for the operation, maintenance, and the 
use of collected fees, and maybe a subsidy to cover con-
struction and operating costs. When the operation period 
expires, all facilities are transferred to the local govern-
ment. A building-operation model (BO) has also been 
developed for private operation under public ownership, 
which means the heating infrastructure is invested in and 
constructed by private enterprises. The company can 
also transfer the ownership, so the local government will 
own this infrastructure after the contract expiration. That 
is the case in the so-called building-operation-transfer 
model (BOT). 
Thus, China has implemented a concession operation 
system for management of the DH supply in most of its 
towns and cities. The heating enterprises sign a contract 
with the local government through public bidding, after 
which the heating company participates in the construc-
tion, operation, and renovation of the plant and the heat 
distribution net. In short, the heating companies are 
given monopolies in heat production and distribution 
with integrated operation management. The heating 
price and other conditions are set up by the municipal 
departments and must be submitted to the provincial 
price authorities for approval. 
The advantage of this system is that private manage-
ment expertise can be used to improve the efficiency and 
service quality under a market regime. The disadvantage 
is that private enterprises take fewer risks, and the rate of 
return is typically fairly low; thus, the incentive to adopt 
long-term efficiency-enhancing measures may be lim-
ited. Based on experiences from the Danish Energy 
Agency, commercial investors often require 8% or more 
as an internal rate of return, while municipally owned or 
consumer-owned DH companies require a substantially 
lower return in order to make economic ends meet, as 
their purpose is to establish an affordable and locally 
controlled long-term heat solution. A similar trend is 
found in the UK [47]. Furthermore, the public-private 
contract must be very specific and extensive regarding 
the choice of quantitative criteria for measuring perfor-
mance, etc., which often requires previous experience 
from the sector. It must also be taken into account that 
the BO and BOT models may cause undesirable costs 
because of the “buy or pay” provision due to the pur-
chase guarantee; thus, the final consumer may encounter 
higher costs for the heat energy.
3.7 ESCO market for commercial owners
In order to allow market actors to gain a fair earning on 
their investment, while at the same time protecting con-
sumers from unintended price hikes from misuse of 
market forces or insufficient provision of data, another 
option can be considered. If a new or retrofitted DH 
supply is planned, an energy service company (ESCO) 
can provide the required investment capital, technology, 
and information to establish DH.
In many countries, an ESCO is a well-tested means to 
improve energy efficiency by implementing energy- 
efficiency projects in the private and public sector. The 
advantage is that an ESCO offers a (group of) energy 
consumer(s) the energy service at a competitive price if 
the consumer(s) agrees to buy the service for a fixed 
period under specified conditions. Typically, heat is sold 
for a fixed price for a number of years in advance, which 
makes it easy for heat consumers to estimate the poten-
tial cost advantages. Thus, heat consumers are somewhat 
protected against unexpected price hikes, as they are 
guaranteed a fixed price.
Danish experience with ESCOs in the heat sector is 
relatively new. Private ESCOs offer, for example, small 
villages the opportunity to replace their individual oil 
stoves with small-scale DH based on large heat pumps 
or large wood pellet stoves at favourable terms. The 
ESCO makes the investment, and establishes, runs, and 
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maintains the local heat plant at a fixed price, which 
typically is lower than the heat price of individual oil 
stoves. This business concept exists in various forms 
and can also be used to develop medium- or large-scale 
DH in other countries. The business model was anal-
ysed and recommended in a report for the Danish 
Energy Agency [48]. This paved the way for a new 
support scheme, where 4 enterprises won a public bid 
to promote heat pumps as a replacement for oil stoves 
[49]. Other DH plants offer small community heat 
solutions based on solar heating or biomass on similar 
ESCO terms.
However, ESCOs are very active in energy services 
with a high internal rate of return. Energy savings and 
increased energy efficiency at large industries are often 
preferred, as the investment can be repaid over the 
course of only 2–4 years. DH differs from such projects, 
as DH is a long-term investment with a stable but limited 
internal rate of return. The Danish experience is that 
ESCOs now are becoming very active in supplying 
small-scale DH to small villages and medium-sized 
communities if the present heat price is relatively high 
due to the heat source being individual oil stoves, etc. 
But the ESCO businesses are now considering business 
in medium- or large-scale DH, which may be an active 
future business. A fairly large number of such DH plants 
are now promoting renewable energy-based heat to vil-
lages, e.g. the village-based heat projects in the Rebild 
municipality [50].
One challenge with ESCOs (and possibly PPPs) is 
that the private company can (un)intentionally run into 
issues not specified in the contract, which then leads to 
renegotiations and legal challenges to raise the revenue 
for the private company. One solution is to let a third 
party standardise the terms and verification of the ser-
vices under contract.
ESCOs typically require stable investment condi-
tions, i.e. a stable regulatory framework and carefully 
prepared contractual obligations with regard to delivery 
conditions, maintenance, and calculation of costs. They 
also require the presence of several competing ESCOs in 
order to ensure competitive prices. 
The ESCO model can be implemented in various 
forms. Establishing incentives to operate and maintain 
the DH plants sustainably, e.g. incentives to hand over 
the plant in an optimal technological state when the 
contract expires after maybe 20 years, should be con-
sidered. This can be achieved by the stipulation of 
proper incentives and technical specifications in the 
contract.
The use of ESCOs in larger DH supplies requires 
carefully prepared contractual obligations with regard to 
delivery conditions, maintenance, and calculation of 
costs. In order to minimise risks, standard contracts 
could be developed by key stakeholders in cooperation 
with the responsible ministry. In larger DH supplies, the 
consumers could also be safeguarded by establishing 
public ownership of the distribution net, i.e. production 
and distribution is unbundled.
4. Regulatory context of price models
Some types of price-setting regimes may serve as a 
favourable cornerstone in a country’s DH model, but 
they may require a legal set-up, well-established institu-
tions, and access to data, etc., and that takes time. 
Therefore, a gradual development of one or several pre-
ferred types of DH models may be an option. That 
would enable the central DH authority to implement DH 
in the short term, while developing the institutions, legal 
regulations, and so on needed for a preferred model at a 
later stage.
Furthermore, a uniform model may not be the best 
solution if the DH communities differ according to 
market size, size of population, proximity of excess heat, 
different types of housing and consumer groups, etc. 
Thus, one specific DH model may apply for a small, 
geographically remote town, while the DH supply to a 
large city may benefit from another DH model.
Finally, the use of efficiency-enhancing regulation 
should be considered to the largest extent possible in all 
preferred DH models. The Danish experiences and spe-
cific means and policies listed below could be consid-
ered and adjusted to a specific setting in other countries. 
There are many local, well-functioning ways to address 
these issues, which could also be highlighted.
4.1 Means and incentives to ensure low costs when 
selling heat for true costs in Denmark
At least seven different means can be applied to 
strengthen the development of an efficient DH system 
with reasonably consumer prices: 
4.1.1. Compulsory use of a standardised feasibility 
study
DH project approval must be based on a feasibility study 
built on a standardised and well-tested method. The fea-
sibility study must document that DH is the least-cost 
option compared to alternative heat supplies. Calculations 
on, for example, the consumer economy and the 
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socio-economy must be performed. The calculation 
method applied is a levelised cost of energy, whereby 
low consumer prices over a 20-year period are obtained. 
The above-mentioned District Heating Assessment Tool 
has been developed to transfer this method to other 
countries [38].
4.1.2 An efficiency-enhancing measure exists due to 
competition via third party access 
Third party access must be guaranteed if a feasibility 
study documents that an external heat supplier can lower 
the consumer price and enhance the socio-economic 
benefits. 
4.1.3 Actual costs are covered by the consumer heat 
prices
A down payment or installation fee per installation can 
contribute to repayment of the capital investment loans. 
Thus, it ensures a guaranteed payment to the DH com-
pany, which facilitates safe repayment of the investment 
loan.
A tariff per gigajoule of consumption that covers fuel 
purchase and other running costs should be employed. 
Thus, consumers pay for the actual heat (GJ). This offers 
an incentive to save heat and have a lower heating bill. 
Some DH supplies have also established a capacity 
price (e.g. GJ/h) to decrease peaks. Lower prices per 
GJ/h can also be obtained for a lower temperature of the 
return water—this is often executed by an app, where 
each heat consumer can follow the temperature and the 
lower price for the lower temperature, etc. 
4.1.4 Subsidies are passed on directly to DH plants and 
consumers
The central government passes on subsidies for bio-
mass-based energy production, etc. directly to the DH 
companies. Thus, the transmission system operator, 
which has the data needed, administers and conveys 
financial subsidies directly to the DH company. It is not 
passed through local governments, which prevents the 
risk of local government expropriation of central state 
subsidies. 
Targeted subsidies are available for low-income con-
sumers, so the true-cost tariffs do not hurt vulnerable 
groups. In order to ensure that such subsidies reach the 
target groups, the heating bill—including possible subsi-
dies—is sent directly from the DH plant to each individ-
ual consumer. The heating bill is not passed on through 
a local government authority.
4.1.5 Access to data and standardised consumer price 
benchmarks
Consumer price benchmarks for fixed and variable tar-
iffs are made publicly available for all DH companies 
2–3 times per year, which puts pressure on the DH com-
pany boards to continuously improve their economic 
performance. The statistics are published by the central 
authority for monitoring supply companies (Danish 
Utility Regulator). 
All heat companies are obliged to hand over a stan-
dard set of detailed information on their prices, tariffs, 
delivery conditions, etc. to the relevant central authori-
ties. Non-compliant heat companies can be punished by 
fines, and so on. 
In order to ensure full transparency and proper bench-
marking, DH companies must use a standardised account 
plan and the same accountancy period (calendar year). 
4.1.6 Voluntary economic performance benchmarks 
The national branch organisation calculates and pub-
lishes economic benchmarks for each DH company. 
This is widely used as a point of entry for the informal 
exchange of information among DH companies on how 
to improve company performance.
Furthermore, the national branch organisation for all 
DH plants offers voluntary courses in the adoption of 
new technology and advice on technical issues, etc.; 
thus, the branch organisation offers proactive consul-
tancy on behalf of their members.
It takes time to establish such a national organisation, 
to gain the confidence needed among all stakeholders, 
and to task the branch organisation. Other countries 
may, alternatively or until a well-functioning organisa-
tion has been established, use third party organisations 
and consultancy companies for specific tasks. 
4.1.7 Independent central authorities
Independent central authorities to monitor prices and 
handle complaints are pivotal for obtaining legitimate 
supervision and monitoring of prices and delivery 
 conditions. 
5. Conclusion
The collection of experiences of regulating DH shows 
the diversity of options available. In this paper, an 
attempt has been made to collect and categorise these 
experiences. They are based mainly on Danish experi-
ences, but findings from other countries have also been 
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included. The general findings are summarised below, 
which of course should be adjusted to the specific local 
setting according to the culture, technological capability, 
existing energy structure, institutions, regulations, poli-
cies, etc.
5.1 True-cost principle
Danish experiences are mainly positive with regard to 
affordable consumer prices and increased efficiency, but 
efficiency-enhanced measures have been implemented, 
and proper regulation and supervision need to be 
applied.
5.2 Regulated return to investor
If the central or local authorities are short of investment 
funds or prefer to share the responsibility with profes-
sional, external investors, this system may be an option. 
However, investors with stable, long-term interests must 
be identified and detailed investment conditions, and 
maybe opt-out options, must be prepared. DH distribu-
tion nets can be owned or controlled by local heat 
authorities or the like, as unbundling is an important 
safety measure. 
5.3 Liberalised price set by the market
Swedish experiences suggest the (potential) misuse of 
market power when DH is a natural monopoly. Thus, 
new reforms for price setting were adopted, which 
required active administrative interference with respect 
to regulation and access to multiple data from market 
actors. A similar tight public supervision and monitoring 
of DH data have also been found to be necessary in 
Estonia.
5.4 Natural gas-based substitution price of heat
Fixing of DH prices may cause unviable heat sale reve-
nues, which threaten O&M and investments in new 
technologies. Furthermore, the price of individual natu-
ral gas can be lowered by strategic business decisions 
rather than increased effectiveness.
5.5 Price cap based on alternative supplies
If the price cap is too high, the cap may give an incentive 
to raise the price to the maximum price allowed. If the 
price cap is too low, it may threaten the long-term eco-
nomic sustainability.
5.6 Private operation under public ownership
If a local government lacks expertise in developing or 
operating an efficient DH supply, such management may 
be transferred to a private enterprise through lease or 
authorisation contract. But undesirable costs may occur 
due to a “buy or pay” provision via a purchase guarantee 
or the like; thus, the final consumer may encounter 
higher costs. As the risk for the private enterprise is typ-
ically limited, and proper incentives must be prepared, 
performance measures must be specified in the contract.
5.7 ESCO market for commercial owners
ESCO may provide a framework for competitive market 
prices and delivery conditions. The advantage is that 
consumers are assured a fixed heat price. Compared to 
several of the above types of price regimes, relatively 
limited regulation and supervision is required. However, 
the use of standard contracts formulated by stakeholders 
and the ministry responsible should be considered.
Efficiency-enhancing means and policies must be 
considered in the planning phase and adopted in each 
specific DH supply.
A mix of price-setting regimes and ownership models, 
etc. can be chosen. The choice of model may depend on 
the specific circumstances, considering, among others, 
the scale of the heat market, the local availability of 
waste heat, existing ownership of housing, present and 
future development of a stable regulatory framework, 
and confidence-building measures for commercial or 
public investors.
This article has provided an empirical collection of 
approaches to price regulation. Further research could 
entail a deeper analysis of each of them and could more 
systematically investigate under which circumstances 
the different options would be most suitable.
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